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             The aim of the paper 
            The aim of the paper is to analyze how corruption contributes to the spread of shadow 
economy and damages viable economic development of any country. The unfreedoms that are 
created under the conditions of illegal transactions and corrupt practices considerably limit the 
opportunities of individuals to develop and use their capabilities (Sen, 2000) to the full extent 
and make their contribution to the development of their countries‟ economies and sociocultural 
progress. The short-sighted desire to receive gain and extra revenue through illegal actions often 
obscures the capacity to comprehend the size and extent of the damage that such actions bring to 
the economic development of the country and sociocultural progress of the society in the long 
run. Under these conditions, the paper perceives logic (e.g. cost-benefit analysis, pragmatic 
calculations of profit-making, etc.), morality (i.e. ethical norms) and intuition (i.e. the intuitive 
decision whether to engage in illegal practices, where the estimation of the degrees of risk and 
confidence plays significant role) as three important human features that influence individuals‟, 
corporations‟ and governments‟ decisions whether or not to engage directly or foster indirectly 
the cultivation of illegal practices. Therefore, the idea that the paper is trying to support is that 
while analyzing the instances of corruption on any given level (individual, organizational, 
governmental, or cross-country), the factors of logic, moral and intuition should be all taken into 
consideration in order to better understand such illegal actions, systems, channels and 
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mechanisms and design more comprehensive fighting strategies against corruption than are 
offered today by numerous scholars, organizations or public bodies.    
 
                Background 
               The fact that corruption in various sectors (both public and private) destroys economy 
and hinders socioeconomic development of countries is not a novelty any longer. However, 
delineating what is legal and what is illegal, building viable institutions that would take on 
responsibility of monitoring how public and private sectors adhere to the law, and designing anti-
corruption policies that would be applicable to different conditions, cultures and countries still 
present challenges to policymakers and officials across the world.      
            Increasing number of policymakers connect corruption in various sectors with weak 
governance, weak legal and regulatory systems, or poor economic condition. For instance, De 
Soto (2003) blames the absence of law (especially legal titles on property) as the major reason 
why corruption flourishes in developing countries and hinders economic development. 
According to Sen (2000), corruption can be regarded as one of the unfreedoms that is often 
created by corrupt governments and that limits individuals in developing capabilities and 
prevents organizations from building international and transnational businesses. Sachs (2006) 
names poor governance (i.e. plagued by corruption)   as one of the reasons why poor nations 
cannot „jump on the ladder‟ and develop. Zweifel (2005) names transparency and accountability 
(and hence, the decrease of corruption) as one of the criteria for measuring the effective 
operation of international organizations, while Easterly (2007) claims that international 
organizations don‟t wish to cooperate with „bad governments‟ (i.e. corrupt governments). 
Besides, one of his critiques of Sachs‟ ready-made recipes on how to help the poor nations is the 
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lack of accountability on the part of the organizations to the wider public regarding the delivery 
and efficient utilization of aid. Lack of accountability in itself leads to the increase of secrecy 
and corruption.  
           Furthermore, Ryterman (in Campos and Pradhan, 2007) states that corruption is a 
hindrance to economic growth and points to its detrimental consequences for the poor. 
„Governance and anticorruption are now high priorities in the development agenda. Empirical 
research over the past decade has shown convincingly that poor governance, typically manifested 
by different forms of corruption, is a major deterrent to investment and economic growth and has 
a disproportionate impact on the poor. In-depth case studies have given form and life to these 
quantitative findings and have brought home the reality that corruption is indeed harmful to the 
individual, family, community, and society as a whole. Globally, public awareness of the 
detrimental impact and severity of the problem has increased markedly, as the media, policy 
institutes, and nongovernmental organizations worldwide have raised concerns to unprecedented 
levels‟ (Ryterman, 2007, cited in Campos and Pradhan, 2007: xv-xvi).  
          
The basis of corruption – informal socioeconomic and political control and manipulation with 
quality, rules and regulations 
 
            In order to fight corruption in different spheres and contexts, certain universal features 
constituting its basis should be traced and diagnosed. Considering the issue of the basis of 
corruption in wider political and socioeconomic context might be useful. Several suggestions 
could be offered in answering the posed question. 
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            First, self-complacency of top officials might be at the basis of corruption. The principle 
of „earn and let others earn‟ in order to feel secure in the closed vicious circle of „fellow co-
thinkers‟ might be at work here. 
            Second, it is a widely-held belief that under the conditions of scarce resources, struggle 
for receiving the share from bribes – as an extra income in dire economy is a common practice. 
Officials in government might receive shares from different public or private spheres as an extra 
income. In return, they offer lobbying the interests of those organizations in governmental bodies 
during decision-making process. Hence, lack of resources and power struggle for obtaining share 
from the limited resources might trigger dishonest, corrupt practices. 
          Third, short-sighted strategy of covering up economic catastrophe by creating conducive 
environment for people to engage in illegal transactions, deals and practices might be another 
basis for corruption. The formula of people „feeding each other‟ through illegal channels when 
the government has not much to offer might be at play in this respect.  
             Fourth, the desire of corrupt governments to engender support in public or private 
sectors by turning a blind eye on the corrupt practices might be another basis of spreading 
corruption. A government might give liberty to businesses, companies, etc. to engage in corrupt 
practices in the hope of their support in giving votes during elections. Therefore, by giving them 
an opportunity to earn „a second income‟ under the conditions of economic crisis and limited 
resources, a government actually develops a kind of mutually supporting mechanism. This fact 
creates a particularly conducive condition for the “trap” of corruption that the whole country 
might engage and hardly manage to overcome.  
            Fifth, corruption exists when and where there is a) a lack of public information and b) 
uncertainty about how an individual‟s rights and interests can be protected. Under uncertain 
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circumstances, it is easier for the government officials to manipulate with laws, rules and 
regulations and give them the interpretation that gives most benefit to them. This could be 
another reason why the governments may not be willing to prevent corruption in the country. 
The shifty character of quality creates basis to manipulations and corrupt practices in different 
public and private spheres. 
 
            Logic, morality and intuition 
 
            The first factor that should be considered is the logic behind engaging in corrupt 
practices. The purely pragmatic reasons (monetary profit-making, non-monetary benefits and 
privileges, etc.), as well as the basis of corruption (i.e. possible explanations on why would 
governments, top officials or individuals in authority allow for the spread of corruption in a 
country), could serve as the examples of logic lying behind the corruption and driving shadow 
economy.          
            The presence or absence of ethical norms, moral beliefs in individuals (Browne and 
Milgram, 2009), as well as the realization of the importance of social responsibility by 
businesses, companies and organizations, and the strife for common welfare by the governments 
could serve possible explanatory variables for accounting and understanding individual, 
organizational or governmental actions and the degree of their involvement (direct or indirect) in 
corrupt practices, illegal transactions and informal agreements. The realization of the fact how 
short-term personal gains might lead to long-term overall economic and social damage could be 
analyzed and researched in this respect in order to better understand how human nature operates 
under the conditions and cases discussed throughout the paper.  
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           Intuition on whether to engage in corrupt practice, how confident might a person or 
organization be in this respect, or the considerations of risk-involvement in such cases, as well as 
the deeply-rooted human intuitive ability of considering what is right or wrong (and that could be 
closely related to the moral factor discussed above) is the third aspect that should be considered 
while studying the cases of corruption in different contexts across countries and regions (Watson 
and Moran, 2005; Lambsdorff, 2002a).  
 
Corruption cases in different spheres across the world 
 
              Campos and Pradhan (2007) present the compilation of case studies and analysis by 
different authors from various spheres where corruption can prosper under the conditions of 
weak governance, deregulation, lack of transparency, accountability, non-professionalism, etc. 
and destroy the economic viability of a single or group of countries. A few examples will suffice 
to illustrate the point. 
              Kishor and Damania (2007, in Campos and Pradhan, 2007: 89- 114) discuss corruption 
in the forestry section. „The scale and scope of corruption in the forest sector sets it apart from 
others. Forest- related corruption has been reported in countries as diverse as Cameroon and 
Canada. It can take numerous forms – petty bribery and extortion by forest officials, or payments 
to higher-level administrators for timber concessions, to inducements to sanction changes in land 
use, and most sinister of all, to the erosion of institutions beyond the sector and across the 
economy‟ (Kishor and Damania (2007, in Campos and Pradhan, 2007: 89-90). Further they 
provide examples of corruption in the forest sector, as well as the costs and consequences of 
forest corruption. Following are the examples: Ministers, legislators, and other high officials 
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accept bribes to shape forest laws, institutions, and procedures, and award concessions to favor 
the bribers. Officials award timber concessions to their relatives. Forest officers, police officers, 
and prosecutors take bribes to ignore violations of forest laws, including laws forbidding harvests 
in national parks and laws protecting endangered species. …To avoid delays in issuance of 
timber transit permits, landowners bribe not only the local forester but also local tax and land 
officials. …In a forest-related court case, bribes fly to the court clerks, the judges, and even 
opposing counsel to secure a favorable and prompt verdict. Officials take bribes to allow export 
of illegally harvested timber. Customs agents take bribes to allow timber to enter the country 
without paying duties or in violation of endangered species protections. A forest officer demands 
that his subordinates pay him kickbacks for salary increases and promotions. A forest officer 
places friends and relatives on the agency payroll, even though they are “ghosts” who do no 
actual work. Ministers use timber receipts to fund political campaigns. Ministers siphon money 
off of donor-sponsored projects for personal enrichment.  
            Afterwards some specific examples are provided from individual countries: Canada, 
where violations were detected in 55 percent of areas designated for protection; Brazil, where a 
presidential commission concluded that fully 71 percent of the management plans in concessions 
did not comply with the law; The Russian Federation, where at least 20 percent of timber logged 
is in violation of the law; Papua New Guinea, where the majority of forestry operations cannot 
credibly be said to comply with national laws and regulations and are therefore unlawful. 
Cambodia, where only 10 percent of logging in 1997 was estimated to be legal. Cameroon, 
where an estimated one-third of the timber cut in 1992-93 was undeclared. „Not surprisingly, 
global comparisons of governance find that the major forest producers, that is, developing 
economies highly dependent on forest resources, are among the most corrupt countries in the 
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world‟ (Kishor and Damania (2007, in Campos and Pradhan, 2007: 89-90).  
            Kishor and Damania (2007, in Campos and Pradhan, 2007: 91-92) also present the 
analysis of the costs and consequences of corruption in the forest sector:  
            In addition to direct financial losses, other negative effects emerge from illegal logging 
and forest corruption. 
 Violation of protected areas threatens the conservation of forest resources and biodiversity. 
 As many as 60 million people living in and around the forests are heavily dependent on them for 
their subsistence. The well-being of these vulnerable groups is at risk from illegal logging and 
unauthorized removals from the forest.  
 Forests are global public good and their degradation imposes global costs, such as climate 
change and species loss. 
 Legitimate forest enterprises are subjected to unfair competition through price undercutting and 
are discouraged from making socially and environmentally responsible investments in the sector.  
 Less visible though insidious costs result from the erosion of institutions, the spread of 
corruption across the economy (including speculative and other illegal activities), and lower 
economic growth.  
               The most detrimental consequence of the corruption in one sector is its spillover effect 
to other sectors, to government structures and public sector, that might also diffuse to other 
countries, and ultimately paralyze the economy of not one single country but a group of countries 
and even regions.   
   Anecdotal evidence suggests that economies of scale are probably present among illicit 
activities. Thus illegal logging is often accompanied by other crimes such as arms, human, and 
drug trafficking. Corruption contagion is probably the most significant, though least recognized, 
consequence of forest crime. Its impacts are transmitted through the economy, weakening 
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governance and the rule of law, thus impeding investment in legitimate commerce and 
undermining faith in the legitimacy of the government apparatus (Kishor and Damania, 2007, in 
Campos and Pradhan, 2007: 92-93).  
 
            McPherson and MacSearraigh (2007, in Campos and Pradhan, 2007: 191-220) analyse 
the corrupt practices in the petroleum sector, that often causes „the paradox of plenty‟ in 
developing countries. The idea behind the paradox is that while some 32 developing countries 
around the world are considered petroleum rich, they experience low growth relative to their 
nonoil peers. „This counterintuitive result is referred to as the “resource curse” or “paradox of 
plenty”.  
         Nigeria provides just one example of the paradox of plenty. Assessed against desirable 
developmental outcomes, the performance of this oil-rich country has been significantly below its 
potential and even below that of many of its non-oil Sub-Saharan African Neighbors. GDP per 
capita is $400 per year, 60 percent of the population lives on less than $2 per day, 78 out of every 
1,000 infants dies at birth, 35 percent of the population under five years of age is malnourished, 
barely 50 percent of the adult female population is literate, and so on. …The record is dismal, yet 
over the past 35 years, oil rents accruing to Nigeria have amounted to an estimated $300 billion. 
Nigeria, however, is not unique. Its experience is replicated throughout African oil-producing 
countries and in other regions of the world where there is similar dependence on oil and gas…. 
       The sheer scale of the oil and gas industry and its supporting infrastructure often result in 
natural monopolies in areas such as pipeline transport, terminaling, and port facilities. Monopoly 
control creates opportunities for corrupt abuse through discretionary control of access and through 
the setting of fees or tariffs for use.  
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The cases of corruption in countries in transition: the risks of post-soviet way of building 
democracies 
            
          After the collapse of the Soviet Union there was a “redistribution of property” – perhaps 
one of the largest-scale in history. The transition period of the 1990s was characterized by 
struggles between different power groups to gain access to a portion of the redistributed 
property. Countries in transition are susceptible to corruption because of having unstable and 
under-developed legal and regulatory systems, and due to not well defined duties, rights and 
responsibilities of officials in different public structures. These create the conditions under which 
corrupt practices might flourish.  
             In an attempt to transform from centralized planned economy into open-market, private-
type structure and utilize the „re-distributed‟ property, the post-soviet countries tried to 
implement policies that were conducted by former soviet bureaucrats. Oftentimes this implied 
uncontrolled power abuse, illegal and corrupt practices by those in whose hands appeared the 
lump sum of the re-distributed wealth. Naturally, these conditions had spillover effects on almost 
all public or private spheres.  
            Unregulated social and public services, corrupt power-supply and electricity „business‟;  
fraudulent-type of taxation system; corrupt schools, universities and hospitals; corrupt police, 
law-protecting organs and judiciary system (in fact judges and prosecutors appeared to be the 
most adaptable, flexible and profit-making oriented types of professions which could provide the 
best study material for the deciphering of logic, morality and intuition lying behind the corrupt 
actions and channels involved in  them).     
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            Bribery, monetary or non-monetary gifts for gaining easy access to the public good; 
abuse of power for personal and professional gain, informal contracts and agreements for illegal 
use of public premises, buildings and facilities, nepotism and favoring one‟s own family 
members, friends or relatives became widely-spread practices that plagued post-soviet territory 
during those years. Money laundering through building hospitals, schools, kindergartens, 
supermarkets, travel agencies or any other private businesses became commonplace.  
            The 1990s could be characterized as the period of changing the nature of corrupt 
practices from high degree of nepotism and favoritism within closed elite circles to „free 
unregulated market type‟ actions mostly revealed in illegal monetary transactions.   
            Corrupt officials that had been the common features of the soviet period bureaucrats, 
were transforming into new-type businessmen‟ that fostered chaotic, unregulated systems and 
structures dominated by corruption, illegal contracts and agreements.  
             The paper assumes that the security and complacency of closed elite circles of the soviet 
period transformed into chaotic uncontrolled market economy-driven illegal deals of the 1990s, 
and later grew into the fight for scarce resources that was triggered by raising public awareness 
through new policies and wide-scale debates on the reforms in almost all public spheres. 
           
Corruption, shadow economy in transition countries and their impact on economic growth 
           
          Lacko (2000) offers the analysis of the impact of shadow economy on the development of 
countries in transition. „The study investigates the size of the hidden economy and related 
features, in post-socialist countries. After dealing critically with the approach of Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda, a method based on household electricity consumption is used to estimate the ratio of 
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the hidden economy to the official GDP in 20 countries (Lacko, 2000, 117-149). The argument 
offered is that the high level of corruption in transition economies has a negative impact on 
production.  
         The level of business-related corruption in the Commonwealth of Independent States and 
Central and Eastern Europe in 2002 is presented in Table 1. The percent of managers who 
consider corruption the major obstacle for the business and entrepreneurial activities is 
considered an indicator of the negative impact of corruption on production.  
        Table 1 
 
        An indicator of business-related corruption (percent of managers surveyed ranking this as a major business 
constraint): 
CEE, 2002* 
Country                      Indicator                         Country                                  Indicator 
Armenia                        13.5                                   Lithuania                                   15.6 
Azerbaijan                    19.5                                    Moldova                                    40.2 
Belarus                         17.9                                    Poland                                       27.6 
Bulgaria                        25.4                                    Romania                                   34.9 
Croatia                          22.5                                    Russia                                       13.7 
Czech Republic            12.5                                    Serbia                                        16.3 
Estonia                           5.4                                     Slovak Republic                       27.5            
Georgia                         35.1                                    Slovenia                                      6.1                                        
Hungary                         8.8                                     Tajikistan                                  21.0 
Kazakhstan                   14.2                                     Ukraine                                    27.8 
Kyrgyz Republic          31.4                                     Uzbekistan                                 8.7 
Latvia                           11.7 
 
Source: World Development Indicators. Retrieved from the database on August 10, 2006. 
* Data for Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Poland, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are for 2003. 
   (In Lacko, 2000).  
 
 
         The data in Table 1 reveals that Moldova and Georgia were leaders in corruption, while in 
Estonia, Slovenia, and Hungary the level of corruption was relatively low as compared to the 
region‟s average.  
       The share of unofficial GDP in Eastern Europe and former USSR for the period of 1989 -
1995 is presented in Table 2. 
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       Almost all countries in transition experienced a sharp increase in shadow economy. The 
unregulated and chaotic conditions in those countries could be named as possible causes for 
fostering the increase of shadow economy through illegal channels, corrupt practices and 
informal agreements. However, at the same time it should be noted that the issues of unreliable, 
biased and subjective-nature of data should be considered while looking at these numbers. This 
is again due to the chaotic and unregulated conditions in the data and information access services 
and institutions like anywhere else.   
Тable 2. 
Unofficial GDP in Eastern Europe and former USSR, 
1989 -1995 
 
Country                                                     Share of unofficial GDP in the total GDP 
                                                                                           (percent) 
                                       1989         1990        1991        1992       1993      1994        1995 
Eastern                             
Europe 
Bulgaria                          22.8          25.1         23.9         25.0        29.9       29.1         36.2 
Czech Rep                        6.0            6.7         12.9         16.9        16.9       17.6         11.3 
Hungary                          27.0          28.0         32.9         30.6        28.5       27.7         29.0 
Poland                            15.7           19.6         23.5         19.7        18.5       15.2         12.6    
Romania                         22.3           13.7        15.7          18.0        16.4       17.4         19.1 
Slovak Rep                       6.0             7.7        15.1          17.6        16.2       14.6           5.8 
 
USSR 
Armenia                          12.0           16.1        20.2          22.0        23.0       27.0         31.6 
Azerbaijan                      12.0            21.9        22.7          39.2       51.2        58.0         60.6 
Belarus                            12.0           15.4        16.6          13.2        11.0       18.9          19.3 
Estonia                            12.0           19.9         26.2          25.4        24.1       25.1         11.8 
Georgia                           12.0            24.9        36.0          52.3        61.0       63.5         62.6 
Kazakhstan                     12.0            17.0        19.7           24.9        27.2       34.1        34.3 
Latvia                              12.0           12.8        19.0           34.3        31.0       34.2         35.3 
Lithuania                         12.0           11.3        21.8           39.2        31.7       28.7         21.6 
Moldova                          12.0           18.1        27.1           37.3        34.0       39.7         35.7 
Russia                              12.0           14.7        23.5           32.8        36.7       40.3         41.6 
Ukraine                            12.0           16.3        25.6           33.6        38.0       45.7         48.9 
Uzbekistan                       12.0           11.4          7.8           11.7        10.1         9.5           6.5 
 
Source: Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), Shleifer (2005). (Also referred in Lacko, 2000).  
 
            As it is shown in the table, Azerbaijan and Georgia were leaders in the share of shadow 
economy in the national economies, and, accordingly, in the share of unofficial GDP in the total 
GDP. The share of unofficial GDP in Azerbaijan in 1995 constituted 60.6 percent of the total 
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GDP, while in Georgia it was equal to 62.6 percent. In the former socialist countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, economic transitions have started earlier than in the USSR, and by 1989 the 
share of unofficial GDP had reached significant value. The share of unofficial GDP in Bulgaria 
was equal to 22.8 percent, in Romania it was 22.3 percent, and in Hungary 27 percent. By the 
end of 1995 Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania remained the leaders in terms of share of unofficial 
GDP among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The share of unofficial GDP in 1995 in 
Bulgaria was equal to 36.2 percent (Lacko, 2000).  
           The share of unofficial GDP in total GDP in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
in the early 2000s is not much higher than the analogous indicator in the countries of Western 
Europe, USA, Canada, and Australia. 
          Table 3 represents the data of the share of the unofficial GDP in the total GDP in the 
countries of Western Europe, USA, Canada, Japan, and Australia in 1990:  
Тable 3. 
Share of the unofficial GDP in the total GDP (percent), in Western Europe, USA, Canada, Japan, and Australia, 
1990 
Country                Percent                                 Country                         Percent 
 
Spain                     22.9                                    Netherlands                        13.4 
Greece                   21.8                                    Finland                               13.3 
Ireland                   20.6                                    Japan                                  13.2 
Belgium                19.8                                     UK                                     13.1 
Italy                       19.6                                     France                               12.3 
Denmark                16.9                                    Canada                              11.7 
Austria                   15.5                                    Sweden                              11.0 
Australia                15.1                                    USA                                   10.5 
Germany                14.9                                    Switzerland                        10.2 
Portugal                 13.8                                     Norway                               9.3 
 
Source: Lackó, M. (1998). The Hidden Economies of Visegrád Countries in International Comparison: A Household 
Electricity Approach. In L. Halpern and C. Wyplosz (Eds.): Hungary: Towards a Market Economy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
          As it can be observed from the table Spain and Greece have the highest share of shadow 
economy (22.9 and 21.8 respectively), while Switzerland and Norway are on the bottom end 
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according to the shadow economy share. This could be explained by their stable economic 
situation. 
           Considering the above discussed factors of logic, morality and intuition of individuals, 
organizations and governments, these cross-country comparisons could provide ample material 
for accounting for actions (or non-actions) on the part of governments, businesses and 
individuals in these respective countries.  
 
Individual actors in corrupt practices across the world: the importance of morality and 
intuition in designing further strategies for combating corruption 
 
            The presence or absence of the degrees of ethical considerations and deeply-rooted 
intuitions might be associated with corrupt actions of certain individuals involved in corrupt 
practices. Besides the logic of profit-making, the morality (or its absence) and intuition driving 
the individual actors while engaging in illegal transactions might be an interesting issue to 
research for future in order to better grasp the mentality of such agents, and perhaps, even predict 
the probabilities to what extent might individual actors engage in such corrupt actions. This 
might appear a useful tool for designing even more comprehensive and more-inclusive strategies 
than are available today. As already illustrated in the above examples, corruption has many 
different manifestations. Therefore, in addition to designing ready-made recipes, looking at 
individual cases and analyzing them might provide rich material for more effective 
understanding of not only organizations and governments, but individuals as well. Understanding 
individual human nature in this respect might give deeper insight to scholars and policymakers to 
elaborate on more complex anti-corruption measures than are offered at present.   
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        Referring to the anticorruption watchdog Transparency International rankings, Campos and 
Pradhan (2007) provide the listings of the 10 most self-enriching leaders in recent years. Ranked 
by the amount each allegedly stole, in U.S. dollars, they are: 
1. Former Indonesian president Suharto ($15-35 billion) 
2. Former Phillipine president Ferdinand Marcos ($5-10 billion) 
3. Former Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko ($5 billion) 
4. Former Nigerian president Sani Abacha ($2-5 billion) 
5. Former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosefvic ($1 billion) 
6. Former Haitian president Jean-Claude Duvalier ($300-800 million)‟ 
7. Former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori ($600 million) 
8. Former Ukrainian prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko ($114-200 million) 
9. Former Nicaraguan president Arnoldo Aleman ($100 million) 
10. Former Phillipine president Joseph Estrada ($78-80 million) 
(Source: Transparency International, 2004, cited in Campos and Pradhan).  
      
           The case of each individual actor named above might provide certain useful material for 
scholars to research the issues of individual agency, corrupt practices, and the role of morality, 
intuition and logic. The individual level might appear useful for understanding the actions of 
groups of agents, organizations, and governments, as all of them are ultimately driven by 
individual actors who use or abuse their power and authority for personal gains, and hinder the 
economic development of their countries.  
 
              Conclusions 
              Corruption and illegal systems could be the best manifestations of manipulative 
character of corrupt governments, organizations, groups or individuals. The manifestations might 
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take different forms. And this fact is not surprising owing to sociocultural differences across 
countries and regions. What the hardest challenge in this respect might be is to see our universal 
human nature through its variable manifestations and then to craft political institutions that build 
on this insight, and in this particular case, to design viable and effective strategies for fighting 
corruption in different spheres of human activity.  
             Another assumption would be to use not only the methods of induction or deduction in 
order to understand certain cases or draw conclusions, but the instances of illegal transactions 
and informal agreements often require the method of abduction (i.e. creative approach to 
understanding any given case). This is owing to the ambiguous and blurry character of the 
phenomenon of corruption, shadow economy and informal contracts that are often surrounded by 
the atmospheres of obscurity, secrecy and illegality and require a wider and multifaceted 
approach for solutions than the provision of straightforward unilinear explanations that in the 
case of informal activities do not always operate. Besides, the variable manifestations of human 
nature mentioned above could again be at work here that further necessitate the application of 
abduction method of analysis.  
             Furthermore, the issue of deep-seated moral intuitions might be raised while studying the 
reasons, causes or cures for corruption. Impeccable logic versus moral intuitions is the 
dichotomy that might be the most complex and shifty in this respect. Individuals often stand at 
the crossroads of logic and intuition while making decisions. Organizations are even more 
complex structures as they consist of multiple agencies and channels where the boundaries 
between impeccable logic, moral intuitions and profit-oriented strategies are considerably 
blurred.  
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             The ethical issues and moral dilemmas facing individuals and organizations are yet other 
issues of interest that are related to the decision-making process of whether or not to engage in 
corrupt practices.   
            The recommendations that are commonly offered by policymakers, international 
organizations or scholars is to increase transparency, accountability, and access to information 
for wider public; to foster transnational cooperation between organizations or governments with 
third party observers that would monitor the efficiency and transparency of any agreement or 
transaction.        
          The recommendations on reforms to decrease the level of corruption are provided by 
Campos and Bhargava (2007). „In trying to operationalize the general principles of reform – 
increase transparency, improve accountability, reduce discretion, dilute monopoly power – it is 
necessary to get a solid practical grip on combating corruption and its varied manifestations‟ 
(Campos and Bhargava, 2007, in Campos and Pradhan, 2007: 1-25). They further offer the 
following strategies that should be implemented to combat corruption: address poor governance 
rather than catch crooks; one size does not fit all (i.e. implement road-map approach for 
individual cases); strengthen electoral institutions; improve legal and judicial systems; improve 
public management; increase recognition of engaging civil society groups in monitoring the 
delivery of sectoral outputs (Campos and Bhargava, 2007, in Campos and Pradhan, 2007: 1-25).    
         In addition to all the above recommendations, the present paper offers the deeper study of 
logic, intuition and moral aspects of individual or collective agencies to better understand how 
corruption works in different contexts. 
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